Jaekyu Lee
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Abstract
Modern processors rely on various speculative mechanisms to meet performance demand. Branch predictors are one of the most important micro-architecture components to deliver performance. However, they have been under heavy scrutiny because of recent side-channel attacks. Branch predictors are indexed using the PC and recent branch histories. An adversary can manipulate these parameters to access and control the same branch predictor entry that a victim uses. Recent Spectre attacks exploit this to set up speculative-execution-based security attacks.
In this article, we aim to mitigate branch predictor side-channels using two-level encryption. At the first level, we randomize the set-index by encrypting the PC using a per-context secret key. At the second level, we encrypt the data in each branch predictor entry. While periodic key changes make the branch predictor more secure, performance degradation can be significant. To alleviate performance degradation, we propose a practical set update mechanism that also considers parallelism in multi-banked branch predictors. We show that our mechanism exhibits only 1.0% and 0.2% performance degradation while changing keys every 10K and 50K cycles, respectively, which is much lower than other state-of-the-art approaches.
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Index Terms
- Securing Branch Predictors with Two-Level Encryption
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