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Bridgeware: the air-gap malware

Published:26 March 2018Publication History
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Abstract

The challenge of combatting malware designed to breach air-gap isolation in order to leak data.

References

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        cover image Communications of the ACM
        Communications of the ACM  Volume 61, Issue 4
        April 2018
        88 pages
        ISSN:0001-0782
        EISSN:1557-7317
        DOI:10.1145/3200906
        Issue’s Table of Contents

        Copyright © 2018 ACM

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        Publication History

        • Published: 26 March 2018

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