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Which is the fairest (rent division) of them all?

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          cover image Communications of the ACM
          Communications of the ACM  Volume 61, Issue 2
          February 2018
          94 pages
          ISSN:0001-0782
          EISSN:1557-7317
          DOI:10.1145/3181977
          Issue’s Table of Contents

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          • Published: 23 January 2018

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