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Bitcoin's underlying incentives

Published:21 February 2018Publication History
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Abstract

The unseen economic forces that govern the Bitcoin protocol.

References

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  1. Bitcoin's underlying incentives

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          cover image Communications of the ACM
          Communications of the ACM  Volume 61, Issue 3
          March 2018
          107 pages
          ISSN:0001-0782
          EISSN:1557-7317
          DOI:10.1145/3190347
          Issue’s Table of Contents

          Copyright © 2018 ACM

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          Publication History

          • Published: 21 February 2018

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