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A Survey and Analysis of the GNSS Spoofing Threat and Countermeasures

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Published:02 May 2016Publication History
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Abstract

Detection and prevention of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) “spoofing” attacks, or the broadcast of false global navigation satellite system services, has recently attracted much research interest. This survey aims to fill three gaps in the literature: first, to assess in detail the exact nature of threat scenarios posed by spoofing against the most commonly cited targets; second, to investigate the many practical impediments, often underplayed, to carrying out GNSS spoofing attacks in the field; and third, to survey and assess the effectiveness of a wide range of proposed defences against GNSS spoofing. Our conclusion lists promising areas of future research.

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  1. A Survey and Analysis of the GNSS Spoofing Threat and Countermeasures

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                  cover image ACM Computing Surveys
                  ACM Computing Surveys  Volume 48, Issue 4
                  May 2016
                  605 pages
                  ISSN:0360-0300
                  EISSN:1557-7341
                  DOI:10.1145/2891449
                  • Editor:
                  • Sartaj Sahni
                  Issue’s Table of Contents

                  Copyright © 2016 ACM

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                  Publication History

                  • Published: 2 May 2016
                  • Accepted: 1 February 2016
                  • Revised: 1 January 2016
                  • Received: 1 November 2014
                  Published in csur Volume 48, Issue 4

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