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Characterizing Web Censorship Worldwide: Another Look at the OpenNet Initiative Data

Published:23 January 2015Publication History
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Abstract

In this study, we take another look at 5 years of web censorship data gathered by the OpenNet Initiative in 77 countries using user-based testing with locally relevant content. Prior to our work, this data had been analyzed with little automation, focusing on what content had been blocked, rather than how blocking was carried out. In this study, we use more rigorous automation to obtain a longitudinal, global view of the technical means used for web censorship. We also identify blocking that had been missed in prior analyses. Our results point to considerable variability in the technologies used for web censorship, across countries, time, and types of content, and even across ISPs in the same country. In addition to characterizing web censorship in countries that, thus far, have eluded technical analysis, we also discuss the implications of our observations on the design of future network measurement platforms and circumvention technologies.

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Transactions on the Web
      ACM Transactions on the Web  Volume 9, Issue 1
      January 2015
      178 pages
      ISSN:1559-1131
      EISSN:1559-114X
      DOI:10.1145/2726021
      Issue’s Table of Contents

      Copyright © 2015 ACM

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      Publication History

      • Published: 23 January 2015
      • Accepted: 1 September 2014
      • Revised: 1 July 2014
      • Received: 1 March 2014
      Published in tweb Volume 9, Issue 1

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