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EMV: why payment systems fail

Published:01 June 2014Publication History
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Abstract

What lessons might we learn from the chip cards used for payments in Europe, now that the U.S. is adopting them too?

References

  1. Bond, M., Choudary, O., Murdoch, S.J., Skorobogatov, S., and Anderson, R. Chip and skim: Cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (San Jose, CA, May 18--21, 2014).Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  2. Drimer, S. and Murdoch, S.J. Keep your enemies close: Distance bounding against smartcard relay attacks. In Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium (Boston, MA, Aug. 6--10, 2007). Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  3. Drimer, S., Murdoch, S.J., and Anderson, R. Thinking inside the box: System-level failures of tamper proofing. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA, May 18--21, 2008). Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  4. Murdoch, S.J. and Anderson, R. Security protocols and evidence: Where many payment systems fail. In Proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security (Barbados, Mar. 3--7, 2014).Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  5. Murdoch, S.J., Drimer, S., Anderson, R., and Bond, M. Chip and PIN is broken. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA, May 16--19, 2010). Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library

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  1. EMV: why payment systems fail

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        Reviews

        Barrett Hazeltine

        This article outlines lessons from the European deployment of smart cards. The intended audience is not coders, but system designers from banks, merchants, regulators, and consumers. European experience should be useful in the US, although the context is somewhat different as consumer protection is more strongly entrenched in the US, and the real battle will probably be about interchange fees, $30 billion, rather than fraud, $3 or $4 billion. In any case, the full effect of implementing smart cards will not be felt for many years until all automated teller machines (ATMs) and point-of-sale (POS) terminals have been updated; newly issued smart cards will continue to have a magnetic strip. Customer identification with smart cards can be done with a personal identification number (PIN) verified on the card or using the existing signature procedure. Some US banks will use PINs, others signatures. The article describes various fraudulent techniques. In the UK, some terminals were not tamper-proof. Fraud losses actually increased in the UK after smart cards were introduced, although they subsequently declined. The increase also reflects card-not-present (CNP) fraud, transactions through the Internet. Another fraud, relay attack, used a fake terminal to gain access to a customer's account. In other frauds, random numbers used in transactions were predictable by accessing a stolen telephone. A stolen card can be used without knowing the PIN through a device between the card and the terminal causing the terminal to believe the card verifies with a signature. The use of PINs puts the customer at a disadvantage in dispute resolution. This article is readable, even fascinating. Online Computing Reviews Service

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        • Published in

          cover image Communications of the ACM
          Communications of the ACM  Volume 57, Issue 6
          June 2014
          103 pages
          ISSN:0001-0782
          EISSN:1557-7317
          DOI:10.1145/2602695
          • Editor:
          • Moshe Y. Vardi
          Issue’s Table of Contents

          Copyright © 2014 Copyright is held by the owner/author(s)

          Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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          Association for Computing Machinery

          New York, NY, United States

          Publication History

          • Published: 1 June 2014

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