skip to main content
10.1145/3243734.3243840acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesccsConference Proceedingsconference-collections
research-article

How You Get Shot in the Back: A Systematical Study about Cryptojacking in the Real World

Published:15 October 2018Publication History

ABSTRACT

As a new mechanism to monetize web content, cryptocurrency mining is becoming increasingly popular. The idea is simple: a webpage delivers extra workload (JavaScript) that consumes computational resources on the client machine to solve cryptographic puzzles, typically without notifying users or having explicit user consent. This new mechanism, often heavily abused and thus considered a threat termed "cryptojacking", is estimated to affect over 10 million web users every month; however, only a few anecdotal reports exist so far and little is known about its severeness, infrastructure, and technical characteristics behind the scene. This is likely due to the lack of effective approaches to detect cryptojacking at a large-scale (e.g., VirusTotal). In this paper, we take a first step towards an in-depth study over cryptojacking. By leveraging a set of inherent characteristics of cryptojacking scripts, we build CMTracker, a behavior-based detector with two runtime profilers for automatically tracking Cryptocurrency Mining scripts and their related domains. Surprisingly, our approach successfully discovered 2,770 unique cryptojacking samples from 853,936 popular web pages, including 868 among top 100K in Alexa list. Leveraging these samples, we gain a more comprehensive picture of the cryptojacking attacks, including their impact, distribution mechanisms, obfuscation, and attempts to evade detection. For instance, a diverse set of organizations benefit from cryptojacking based on the unique wallet ids. In addition, to stay under the radar, they frequently update their attack domains (fastflux) on the order of days. Many attackers also apply evasion techniques, including limiting the CPU usage, obfuscating the code, etc.

Skip Supplemental Material Section

Supplemental Material

p1701-hong.mp4

mp4

402.9 MB

References

  1. 360Netlab. 2018. who is stealing my power web mining domains measurement via dnsmon. https://blog.netlab.360.com/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon-en/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  2. ADGuard. 2018. The State of Cryptojacking. https://crypto.adguard.com/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  3. U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2017. How much electricity does an American home use? https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=97&t=3.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  4. Bitcoin. 2018. bitcoin. https://bitcoin.org/en/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  5. bitcoinlion. 2018. Cryptocurrency Mining Hash Algorithms. http://www.bitcoinlion.com/cryptocurrency-mining-hash-algorithms/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  6. Nicholas Carlini, Adrienne Porter Felt, and David Wagner. 2012. An Evaluation of the Google Chrome Extension Security Architecture.. In USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security). 97--111. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  7. coingecko.com. 2018. Monero Price Chart US Dollar. https://www.coingecko.com/en/price_charts/monero/usd.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  8. Coinhive. 2018. coinhive. https://coinhive.com/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  9. Marco Cova, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna. 2010. Detection and analysis of drive-by-download attacks and malicious JavaScript code. In Proceedings of the 19th international conference on world wide web (WWW). ACM, 281--290. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  10. Charlie Curtsinger, Benjamin Livshits, Benjamin G Zorn, and Christian Seifert. 2011. ZOZZLE: Fast and Precise In-Browser JavaScript Malware Detection.. In USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security). 33--48. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  11. cyrus and. 2018. chrome-remote-interface. https://github.com/cyrus-and/chrome-remote-interface.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  12. deepMiner. 2018. deepMiner. https://github.com/deepwn/deepMiner.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  13. easylist. 2018. EasyList filter subscription. https://github.com/easylist/easylist.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  14. Shayan Eskandari, Andreas Leoutsarakos, Troy Mursch, and Jeremy Clark. 2018. A first look at browser-based Cryptojacking. IEEE Security & Privacy on the Blockchain (IEEE S&B) (2018).Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  15. Ittay Eyal, Adem Efe Gencer, Emin Gün Sirer, and Robbert Van Renesse. 2016. Bitcoin-NG: A Scalable Blockchain Protocol.. In USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI). 45--59. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  16. Ittay Eyal and Emin Gün Sirer. 2014. Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable. In International conference on financial cryptography and data security. Springer, 436--454.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  17. Dan Goodin. 2017. Cryptojacking craze that drains your CPU now done by 2,500 sites. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/11/drive-by-cryptomining-that-drains-cpus-picks-up-steam-with-aid-of-2500-sites/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  18. Alex Hern. 2017. Ads don't work so websites are using your electricity to pay the bills. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/27/pirate-bay-showtime-ads-websites-electricity-pay-bills-cryptocurrency-bitcoin.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  19. intel.com. 2017. Intel Core i5--7400 Processor. https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/products/processors/core/i5-processors/i5--7400.html.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  20. Jquery. 2018. jquery. https://jquery.com/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  21. Keraf. 2017. Blacklist of NoCoin. History for NoCoin/src/blacklist.txt.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  22. Keraf. 2017. NoCoin. https://github.com/keraf/NoCoin.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  23. Eleftherios Kokoris Kogias, Philipp Jovanovic, Nicolas Gailly, Ismail Khoffi, Linus Gasser, and Bryan Ford. 2016. Enhancing bitcoin security and performance with strong consistency via collective signing. In 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16). 279--296. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  24. Matt Murray. 2017. Firefox Quantum vs. Chrome: Which Is Faster? https://www.laptopmag.com/articles/firefox-quantum-vs-chrome.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  25. Michael Nadeau. 2018. What is cryptojacking? How to prevent, detect, and recover from it. https://www.csoonline.com/article/3253572/internet/what-is-cryptojacking-how-to-prevent-detect-and-recover-from-it.html.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  26. Notmining. 2017. notmining. http://notmining.org/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  27. Bad Packets. 2017. Cryptojacking: 2017 Year-End Review. https://badpackets.net/cryptojacking-2017-year-end-review/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  28. Bad Packets. 2018. How to find cryptojacking malware. https://badpackets.net/how-to-find-cryptojacking-malware/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  29. Daniel Plohmann and Elmar Gerhards-Padilla. 2012. Case study of the miner botnet. In 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CYCON). IEEE, 1--16.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  30. Fergal Reid and Martin Harrigan. 2013. An analysis of anonymity in the bitcoin system. In IEEE International Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk, and Trust. 197--223.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  31. RFC. 2016. The scrypt Password-Based Key Derivation Function. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7914.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  32. SimilarWeb. 2018. similarWeb. https://www.similarweb.com/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  33. Whorunscoinhive. 2018. whorunscoinhive. http://whorunscoinhive.com/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  34. Wikipedia. 2018. Page semi-protected Cryptocurrency. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptocurrency.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  35. xd4rker. 2017. Blacklist of MinerBlock. https://github.com/xd4rker/MinerBlock/commi- ts/master/assets/filters.txt.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  36. xd4rker. 2017. MinerBlock. https://github.com/xd4rker/MinerBlock.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  37. Apostolis Zarras, Alexandros Kapravelos, Gianluca Stringhini, Thorsten Holz, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna. 2014. The dark alleys of madison avenue: Understanding malicious advertisements. In Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). ACM, 373--380. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library

Index Terms

  1. How You Get Shot in the Back: A Systematical Study about Cryptojacking in the Real World

      Recommendations

      Comments

      Login options

      Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.

      Sign in
      • Published in

        cover image ACM Conferences
        CCS '18: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
        October 2018
        2359 pages
        ISBN:9781450356930
        DOI:10.1145/3243734

        Copyright © 2018 ACM

        Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

        Publisher

        Association for Computing Machinery

        New York, NY, United States

        Publication History

        • Published: 15 October 2018

        Permissions

        Request permissions about this article.

        Request Permissions

        Check for updates

        Qualifiers

        • research-article

        Acceptance Rates

        CCS '18 Paper Acceptance Rate134of809submissions,17%Overall Acceptance Rate1,261of6,999submissions,18%

        Upcoming Conference

        CCS '24
        ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
        October 14 - 18, 2024
        Salt Lake City , UT , USA

      PDF Format

      View or Download as a PDF file.

      PDF

      eReader

      View online with eReader.

      eReader