LiteHAX: Lightweight Hardware-Assisted Attestation of Program Execution

ABSTRACT

Unlike traditional processors, embedded Internet of Things (IoT) devices lack resources to incorporate protection against modern sophisticated attacks resulting in critical consequences. Remote attestation (RA) is a security service to establish trust in the integrity of a remote device. While conventional RA is static and limited to detecting malicious modification to software binaries at load-time, recent research has made progress towards runtime attestation, such as attesting the control flow of an executing program. However, existing control-flow attestation schemes are inefficient and vulnerable to sophisticated data-oriented programming (DOP) attacks subvert these schemes and keep the control flow of the code intact. In this paper, we present LiteHAX, an efficient hardware-assisted remote attestation scheme for RISC-based embedded devices that enables detecting both control-flow attacks as well as DOP attacks. LiteHAX continuously tracks both the control-flow and data-flow events of a program executing on a remote device and reports them to a trusted verifying party. We implemented and evaluated LiteHAX on a RISC-V System-on-Chip (SoC) and show that it has minimal performance and area overhead.

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Index Terms

• Computer systems organization

  • Embedded and cyber-physical systems

• Security and privacy

  • Security in hardware

  • Systems security

    • Operating systems security