Nation-State Hegemony in Internet Routing

ABSTRACT

While the growth of the Internet has fostered more efficient communications around the world, there is a large digital divide between Western countries and the rest of the world. Countries such as Brazil, China, and Saudi Arabia have questioned and criticized America's Internet hegemony. This paper studies the extent to which various countries rely on the United States and other Western countries to connect to popular Internet destinations in those countries. Unfortunately, our measurements reveal that underserved regions are dependent on North American and Western European regions for two reasons: local content is often hosted in foreign countries (such as the United States and the Netherlands), and networks within a country often fail to peer with one another. Fortunately, we also find that routing traffic through strategically placed relay nodes can in some cases reduce the number of transnational routing detours by more than a factor of two, which subsequently reduces the dependence of underserved regions on other regions. Based on these findings, we design and implement Region-Aware Networking, RAN, a lightweight system that routes a client's web traffic around specified countries with no modifications to client software (and in many cases with little performance overhead).

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