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Power-based side-channel instruction-level disassembler

Published:24 June 2018Publication History

ABSTRACT

Modern embedded computing devices are vulnerable against malware and software piracy due to insufficient security scrutiny and the complications of continuous patching. To detect malicious activity as well as protecting the integrity of executable software, it is necessary to monitor the operation of such devices. In this paper, we propose a disassembler based on power-based side-channel to analyze the real-time operation of embedded systems at instruction-level granularity. The proposed disassembler obtains templates from an original device (e.g., IoT home security system, smart thermostat, etc.) and utilizes machine learning algorithms to uniquely identify instructions executed on the device. The feature selection using Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence and the dimensional reduction using PCA in the time-frequency domain are proposed to increase the identification accuracy. Moreover, a hierarchical classification framework is proposed to reduce the computational complexity associated with large instruction sets. In addition, covariate shifts caused by different environmental measurements and device-to-device variations are minimized by our covariate shift adaptation technique. We implement this disassembler on an AVR 8-bit microcontroller. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed disassembler can recognize test instructions including register names with a success rate no lower than 99.03% with quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA).

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  • Published in

    cover image ACM Conferences
    DAC '18: Proceedings of the 55th Annual Design Automation Conference
    June 2018
    1089 pages
    ISBN:9781450357005
    DOI:10.1145/3195970

    Copyright © 2018 ACM

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    Publication History

    • Published: 24 June 2018

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