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Deception, identity, and security: the game theory of sybil attacks

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Abstract

Classical mathematical game theory helps to evolve the emerging logic of identity in the cyber world.

References

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            • Published in

              cover image Communications of the ACM
              Communications of the ACM  Volume 62, Issue 1
              January 2019
              109 pages
              ISSN:0001-0782
              EISSN:1557-7317
              DOI:10.1145/3301004
              Issue’s Table of Contents

              Copyright © 2018 ACM

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              • Published: 19 December 2018

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