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Security Implications of Redirection Trail in Popular Websites Worldwide

Published:03 April 2017Publication History

ABSTRACT

URL redirection is a popular technique that automatically navigates users to an intended destination webpage with- out user awareness. However, such a seemingly advantageous feature may offer inadequate protection from security vulnerabilities unless every redirection is performed over HTTPS. Even worse, as long as the final redirection to a website is performed over HTTPS, the browser's URL bar indicates that the website is secure regardless of the security of prior redirections, which may provide users with a false sense of security. This paper reports a well-rounded investigation to analyze the wellness of URL redirection security. As an initial large-scale investigation, we screened the integrity and consistency of URL redirections for the Alexa top one million (1M) websites, and further examined 10,000 (10K) websites with their login features. Our results suggest that 1) the majority (83.3% in the 1M dataset and 78.6% in the 10K dataset) of redirection trails among web- sites that support only HTTPS are vulnerable to attacks, and 2) current incoherent practices (e.g., naked domains and www subdomains being redirected to different destinations with varying security levels) undermine the security guarantees provided by HTTPS and HSTS.

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          cover image ACM Other conferences
          WWW '17: Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on World Wide Web
          April 2017
          1678 pages
          ISBN:9781450349130

          Copyright © 2017 Copyright is held by the International World Wide Web Conference Committee (IW3C2).

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          International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee

          Republic and Canton of Geneva, Switzerland

          Publication History

          • Published: 3 April 2017

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          WWW '17 Paper Acceptance Rate164of966submissions,17%Overall Acceptance Rate1,899of8,196submissions,23%

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