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Poisoning the Well: Exploring the Great Firewall's Poisoned DNS Responses

Published:24 October 2016Publication History

ABSTRACT

One of the primary filtering methods that the Great Firewall of China (GFW) relies on is poisoning DNS responses for certain domains. When a DNS request is poisoned by the GFW, multiple DNS responses are received - both legitimate and poisoned responses. While most prior research into the GFW focuses on the poisoned responses, ours also considers the legitimate responses from the DNS servers themselves. We find that even when we ignored the immediate poisoned responses, the cache from the DNS servers themselves are also poisoned. We also find and discuss the IP addresses within the DNS responses we get; in particular 9 IP addresses that are returned as a result for many different poisoned domains. We present the argument that this type of attack may not be primarily targeted directly at users, but at the underlying DNS infrastructure within China.

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      • Published in

        cover image ACM Conferences
        WPES '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
        October 2016
        198 pages
        ISBN:9781450345699
        DOI:10.1145/2994620

        Copyright © 2016 ACM

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        New York, NY, United States

        Publication History

        • Published: 24 October 2016

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        WPES '16 Paper Acceptance Rate14of72submissions,19%Overall Acceptance Rate106of355submissions,30%

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