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Identifying the Scan and Attack Infrastructures Behind Amplification DDoS Attacks

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Published:24 October 2016Publication History

ABSTRACT

Amplification DDoS attacks have gained popularity and become a serious threat to Internet participants. However, little is known about where these attacks originate, and revealing the attack sources is a non-trivial problem due to the spoofed nature of the traffic.

In this paper, we present novel techniques to uncover the infrastructures behind amplification DDoS attacks. We follow a two-step approach to tackle this challenge: First, we develop a methodology to impose a fingerprint on scanners that perform the reconnaissance for amplification attacks that allows us to link subsequent attacks back to the scanner. Our methodology attributes over 58% of attacks to a scanner with a confidence of over 99.9%. Second, we use Time-to-Live-based trilateration techniques to map scanners to the actual infrastructures launching the attacks. Using this technique, we identify 34 networks as being the source for amplification attacks at 98\% certainty.

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Conferences
      CCS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
      October 2016
      1924 pages
      ISBN:9781450341394
      DOI:10.1145/2976749

      Copyright © 2016 ACM

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      Publication History

      • Published: 24 October 2016

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