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Assessing Maritime Customs Process Re-Engineering using Agent-Based Simulation

Published:09 May 2016Publication History

ABSTRACT

Case studies report that corruption is not easily combated by policy changes, and that reform policies can have unexpected side-effects in practice. Using agent-based simulation, this paper studies potential anti-corruption policies in the maritime customs context. We detail an agent-based simulation calibrated on the processes of an archetypal Mediterranean container port (where in-group relationships contribute to a situation of endemic corruption), and describe insights gained about the costs and benefits of various reform policies. Results from the simulation model provide commentary on cases reported in the literature, and offer novel evaluation of policies involving process re-engineering.

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Other conferences
      AAMAS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems
      May 2016
      1580 pages
      ISBN:9781450342391

      Publisher

      International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

      Richland, SC

      Publication History

      • Published: 9 May 2016

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      AAMAS '16 Paper Acceptance Rate137of550submissions,25%Overall Acceptance Rate1,155of5,036submissions,23%

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