One tunnel is (often) enough

Abstract

A longstanding problem with the Internet is that it is vulnerable to outages, black holes, hijacking and denial of service. Although architectural solutions have been proposed to address many of these issues, they have had difficulty being adopted due to the need for widespread adoption before most users would see any benefit. This is especially relevant as the Internet is increasingly used for applications where correct and continuous operation is essential.

In this paper, we study whether a simple, easy to implement model is sufficient for addressing the aforementioned Internet vulnerabilities. Our model, called ARROW (Advertised Reliable Routing Over Waypoints), is designed to allow users to configure reliable and secure end to end paths through participating providers. With ARROW, a highly reliable ISP offers tunneled transit through its network, along with packet transformation at the ingress, as a service to remote paying customers. Those customers can stitch together reliable end to end paths through a combination of participating and non-participating ISPs in order to improve the fault-tolerance, robustness, and security of mission critical transmissions. Unlike efforts to redesign the Internet from scratch, we show that ARROW can address a set of well-known Internet vulnerabilities, for most users, with the adoption of only a single transit ISP. To demonstrate ARROW, we have added it to a small-scale wide-area ISP we control. We evaluate its performance and failure recovery properties in both simulation and live settings.

References

1. http://www.caida.org/data/active/asrelationships/.
2. http://www.routeviews.org.
3. D. Andersen, H. Balakrishnan, F. Kaashoek, and R. Morris. Resilient overlay networks. In SOSP, 2001.
4. D. G. Andersen. Mayday: Distributed filtering for internet services. In USENIX Symposium on Internet Technologies and Systems, 2003.
5. D. G. Andersen, H. Balakrishnan, N. Feamster, T. Koponen, D. Moon, and S. Shenker. Accountable internet protocol (aip). In SIGCOMM, 2008.
6. J. Cowie. The new threat: Targeted internet traffic misdirection. http://www.renesys.com/2013/11/mitm-internet-hijacking/. Retrieved 2014-05-20.
7. C. Dixon, T. Anderson, and A. Krishnamurthy. Phalanx: Withstanding multimillion-node botnets. In NSDI, 2008.
8. M. Dobrescu, N. Egi, K. Argyraki, B.-G. Chun, K. Fall, G. Iannaccone, A. Knies, M. Manesh, and S. Ratnasamy. Routebricks: exploiting parallelism to scale software routers. In SOSP, 2009.
9. Emulab: A network emulation testbed. http://www.emulab.net.
10. P. B. Godfrey, I. Ganichev, S. Shenker, and I. Stoica. Pathlet routing. In SIGCOMM, 2009.
11. S. Han, K. Jang, K. Park, and S. Moon. Packetshader: a gpu-accelerated software router. In SIGCOMM, 2010.
12. P. Hunt, M. Konar, F. P. Junqueira, and B. Reed. Zookeeper: Wait-free coordination for internet-scale systems. In USENIX Annual Technical Conference, 2010.
13. J. John, E. Katz-Bassett, A. Krishnamurthy, T. Anderson, and A. Venkataramani. Consensus routing: the Internet as a distributed system. In NSDI, 2008.
14. E. Katz-Bassett, H. Madhyastha, J. John, A. Krishnamurthy, D. Wetherall, and T. Anderson. Studying blackholes in the Internet with Hubble. In NSDI, 2008.
15. E. Katz-Bassett, H. V. Madhyastha, V. K. Adhikari, C. Scott, J. Sherry, P. Van Wesep, T. Anderson, and A. Krishnamurthy. Reverse traceroute. In NSDI, 2010.
16. E. Katz-Bassett, C. Scott, D. R. Choffnes, I. Cunha, V. Valancius, N. Feamster, H. V. Madhyastha, T. Anderson, and A. Krishnamurthy. LIFEGUARD: practical repair of persistent route failures. In SIGCOMM, 2012.
17. S. Kent, C. Lynn, and K. Seo. Secure border gateway protocol (S-BGP). IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2000.
18. A. Keromytis, V. Misra, and D. Rubenstein. SOS: An architecture for mitigating DDoS attacks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2003.
19. N. Kushman, S. Kandula, and D. Katabi. R-BGP: Staying Connected in a Connected World. In NSDI, 2007.
20. C. Labovitz, S. Iekel-Johnson, D. McPherson, J. Oberheide, and F. Jahanian. Internet inter-domain traffic. In SIGCOMM, 2010.
21. M. Lad, D. Massey, D. Pei, Y. Wu, B. Zhang, and L. Zhang. PHAS: a Prefix Hijack Alert System. In USENIX Security Symposium, August 2006.
22. K. Lakshminarayanan, I. Stoica, S. Shenker, and J. Rexford. Routing as a service. Technical Report UCB/EECS-2006-19, UC Berkeley, 2006.
23. X. Liu, A. Li, X. Yang, and D. Wetherall. Passport: secure and adoptable source authentication. In NSDI, 2008.
24. J. Naous, M. Walfish, A. Nicolosi, D. Mazières, M. Miller, and A. Seehra. Verifying and enforcing network paths with icing. In CoNEXT, 2011.
25. E. Nordstrom, D. Shue, P. Gopalan, R. Kiefer, M. Arye, S. Ko, J. Rexford, and M. J. Freedman. Serval: An End-Host Stack for Service-Centric Networking. In NSDI, 2012.
26. B. Parno, D. Wendlandt, E. Shi, A. Perrig, B. Maggs, and Y.-C. Hu. Portcullis: protecting connection setup from denial-of-capability attacks. In SIGCOMM, 2007.
27. B. Raghavan and A. C. Snoeren. A system for authenticated policy-compliant routing. In SIGCOMM, 2004.
28. G. Rétvári, J. Tapolcai, A. Korösi, A. Majdán, and Z. Heszberger. Compressing IP forwarding tables: Towards entropy bounds and beyond. In SIGCOMM, 2013.
29. S. Savage, A. Collins, E. Hoffman, J. Snell, and T. Anderson. The end-to-end effects of internet path selection. In SIGCOMM, 1999.
30. M. Shand and S. Bryant. IP Fast Reroute Framework. IETF Draft, 2007.
31. I. Stoica, D. Adkins, S. Zhuang, S. Shenker, and S. Surana. Internet indirection infrastructure. In SIGCOMM, 2002.
32. P. Trimintzios, C. Hall, R. Clayton, R. Anderson, and E. Ouzounis. Resilience of the Internet Interconnection Ecosystem. http://www.enisa.europa.eu/.
33. V. Valancius, N. Feamster, J. Rexford, and A. Nakao. Wide-area route control for distributed services. In USENIX Annual Technical Conference, 2010.
34. VICCI: A programmable cloud-computing research testbed. http://www.vicci.org.
35. S. Waterman. Internet traffic was routed via chinese servers. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/nov/15/internet-traffic-was-routed-via-chinese-servers/. Retrieved 2014-05-20.
36. W. Xu and J. Rexford. MIRO: multi-path interdomain routing. In Proc. of SIGCOMM, 2006.
37. X. Yang, D. Clark, and A. W. Berger. NIRA: A New Inter-Domain Routing Architecture. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2007.
38. X. Yang, D. Wetherall, and T. Anderson. TVA: A DoS-limiting Network Architecture. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2008.
39. Z. Zhang, Y. Zhang, Y. C. Hu, Z. M. Mao, and R. Bush. iSPY: detecting IP prefix hijacking on my own. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 18(6):1815--1828, Dec. 2010.

Index Terms

• Networks

  • Network protocols

    • Network layer protocols

      • Routing protocols

  • Network types

    • Packet-switching networks