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I know the shortened URLs you clicked on Twitter: inference attack using public click analytics and Twitter metadata

Published:13 May 2013Publication History

ABSTRACT

Twitter is a popular social network service for sharing messages among friends. Because Twitter restricts the length of messages, many Twitter users use URL shortening services, such as bit.ly and goo.gl, to share long URLs with friends. Some URL shortening services also provide click analytics of the shortened URLs, including the number of clicks, countries, platforms, browsers and referrers. To protect visitors' privacy, they do not reveal identifying information about individual visitors. In this paper, we propose a practical attack technique that can infer who clicks what shortened URLs on Twitter. Unlike the conventional browser history stealing attacks, our attack methods only need publicly available information provided by URL shortening services and Twitter. Evaluation results show that our attack technique can compromise Twitter users' privacy with high accuracy.

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          • Published in

            cover image ACM Other conferences
            WWW '13: Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
            May 2013
            1628 pages
            ISBN:9781450320351
            DOI:10.1145/2488388

            Copyright © 2013 Copyright is held by the International World Wide Web Conference Committee (IW3C2).

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            Association for Computing Machinery

            New York, NY, United States

            Publication History

            • Published: 13 May 2013

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            WWW '13 Paper Acceptance Rate125of831submissions,15%Overall Acceptance Rate1,899of8,196submissions,23%

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