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Enhancing and identifying cloning attacks in online social networks

Published:17 January 2013Publication History

ABSTRACT

Recently Online Social Networks (OSNs) are enjoying a continuous boom, while suffering from omnifarious malicious attacks. Cloning attack is one of the attack patterns towards online social networks, where typically the attacker disguises fake accounts as real users by thieving and copying their profiles, and sends friend requests to the friends of the cloned victim. It is difficult for ordinary users to detect these fake identities because of the identical names and similar profile information. In this paper, we raise two possible improvements, namely snowball sampling and iteration attack, to the regular attack pattern upgrading its efficiency and power, so that the attackers can more easily engage into the community. An experiment has been conducted on Renren, the largest OSN in China, to fully compare and substantiate the effectiveness of the enhanced strategy with traditional attacks and different levels of cloning attacks. Then we discuss approaches to detect cloning attacks and put forward a detector named CloneSpotter, which can be deployed into OSN servers. The detector takes advantage of the detailed login IP records and provides solid evidence of locations, in order to judge whether the suspicious accounts are manipulated by real users or attackers. Besides, we discuss a content-based approach to protect users from cloning attacks, which can be easily implemented into distributed clients.

Our contribution lies in two aspects. First, we improve a threatening attack pattern towards OSNs, and test its effectiveness in real systems. Second, we provide an effective defense method to detect cloning attacks, which is real-time and lightweight. By deploying the detectors, OSN systems can assist users to accurately distinguish cloning accounts, and safeguard their privacy.

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          cover image ACM Conferences
          ICUIMC '13: Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication
          January 2013
          772 pages
          ISBN:9781450319584
          DOI:10.1145/2448556

          Copyright © 2013 ACM

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          Publication History

          • Published: 17 January 2013

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