Guillaume Escamocher
ABSTRACT
We consider existence and computation of symmetric Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) in single-item, sealed-bid, first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids. For the most general case, we show that existence of PSNE is NP-hard. Then, we present algorithmic results for the case of independent valuations and two ways of breaking ties: Vickrey tie-breaking and random tie-breaking.
- A. Blume and P. Heidhues. All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. Journal of Economic Theory, 114(1):170--177, January 2004.Google Scholar
Cross Ref
- G. Escamocher, P. B. Miltersen, and R. Santillan R. Existence and computation of equilibria of first price auctions with integral valuations and bids. Available at www.daimi.au.dk/~bromille/Papers/first.pdf, 2009. Google ScholarDigital Library
- E. Maskin and J. Riley. Equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions. Review of Econ. Studies, 67(3):439--54, 2000.Google ScholarCross Ref
Index Terms
- Existence and computation of equilibria of first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids
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