David L. Dill
Abstract
Debating the public policy issues involved in proposed efforts toward improving voting systems while considering the range of technical and societal challenges.
- Adida, B. and Rivest, R.L. Scratch & vote: Self-contained paper-based cryptographic voting. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on Privacy in Electronic Society (WPES'06) (Alexandria, VA, Oct. 30, 2006), ACM, NY, 29--40. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Norden, L. et al. The Machinery of Democracy: Voting System Security, Accessibility Usability, and Cost. Technical report, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, October 2006.Google Scholar
- The National Institute of Standards and Technology Developing an Analysis of Threats to Voting Systems: vote.nist.gov/threats/.Google Scholar
- Norden, L. et al. The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic Worid, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, October 2006.Google Scholar
- Norden, L. et al. The Machinery of Democracy: Voting System Security, Accessibility, Usability, and Cost. Technical report, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, October 2006Google Scholar
Index Terms
- Point/counterpoint
The U.S. should ban paperless electronic voting machines
Recommendations
Toward a system of checks and balances for electronic voting machines
InfoSecCD '09: 2009 Information Security Curriculum Development ConferenceThe shift to direct recording electronic machines that has been fueled by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 has raised some important concerns. Some question the security of the machines and the possibility of a manufacturer's political agenda affecting ...
U.S. Cybercrime Law: Defining Offenses
In recent years, a new term has arisen—“cybercrime”—which essentially denotes the use of computer technology to commit or to facilitate the commission of unlawful acts, or “crimes.” This article explains why we treat cybercrime as a special class of “...
Reviews
Chaim M Scheff
Technical specialists looking at cutting-edge voting machines have an odd moral dilemma, because of a quasi-religious belief that "in a democracy, votes should be counted as cast," not just statistically, but actually one-by-one. It sounds simple, except when contemplating computer viruses voting: Will vote count mistakes occur randomly, with bias, or maliciously__?__ Presumably, other types of computer errors leave discoverable trails for error-scenario reproducibility. Hopefully such errors are discovered by quality assurance (QA) in research and development before they percolate into medical systems, recreational devices, financial platforms, or the like. Are electronic voting machines to be held to higher security standards of accountability than pacemakers or radio frequency identification (RFID)__?__ Well, the real problem is that ordinary reasonable voters need understandable auditing transparency. Worse still, even as we relax this ordinary-man standard, clearly from the various views and studies referenced in this forum, the professionals' validity and confidence thresholds no longer robustly guarantee the honesty of voting systems. Readers, please vote (1) IF the proposition, "We can now be disenfranchised by playful hackers, NOT just by sinister corrupt political interests," IS (A) an invisible lurking paradigm shift OR (B) an e-junk conspiracy of neo-pulp sci-fi; recursively (2) WILL a recount (A) come to the same quantitative conclusion OR (B) simply reflect volatile reader inconclusiveness__?__ (Hint: "I don't know." Do you__?__ My vote: please read!) Online Computing Reviews Service
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