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Model driven security: From UML models to access control infrastructures

Published:01 January 2006Publication History
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Abstract

We present a new approach to building secure systems. In our approach, which we call Model Driven Security, designers specify system models along with their security requirements and use tools to automatically generate system architectures from the models, including complete, configured access control infrastructures. Rather than fixing one particular modeling language for this process, we propose a general schema for constructing such languages that combines languages for modeling systems with languages for modeling security. We present several instances of this schema that combine (both syntactically and semantically) different UML modeling languages with a security modeling language for formalizing access control requirements. From models in the combined languages, we automatically generate access control infrastructures for server-based applications, built from declarative and programmatic access control mechanisms. The modeling languages and generation process are semantically well-founded and are based on an extension of Role-Based Access Control. We have implemented this approach in a UML-based CASE-tool and report on experiments.

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  1. Model driven security: From UML models to access control infrastructures

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                Holger Giese

                This paper reports on early stage research on the processing of background textual materials to identify key concepts for composing requirements of a respective solution system. As an example, it reports on processing the text (44,000 words, 65 pages) of automatic traffic control notes, conversations, interviews, and so on to predict key unified modeling language (UML) classes of the system. This processing is referred to in the title as "early phase requirements engineering." The reported processing tools essentially order words in the text on the basis of word frequencies, and compare them with a variety of statistics on the words in various directories. The low power of these techniques probably explains the term "shallow knowledge" in the title. Some more powerful techniques are cited in the references; highly sophisticated text abstracting, indexing, and classification techniques are available, and can be used in a similar way. The paper does not discuss attaining the "deep understanding" mentioned in the title, but it does describe the results of the example. Interestingly, one of the reasons for selecting the automatic traffic control example is that the first author is a domain expert in this area, and could evaluate the value of the results of the processing. Automatic traffic control is a critical system, and would require deep investigation to formulate its requirements. Thus, how is the automatic processing likely to save an investigator's time__?__ Online Computing Reviews Service

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